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Epistemic:Root: :Particular: General 
Virginia Brennan 
1. Introduction 
Very often, when we talk about situations in the world, we talk about particular 
situations. Also frequently, we talk about kinds of situations or classes of situations. For 
example, given a context of utterance, 1 is probably only about one situation, whereas 2 
might well describe a number of different situations. 
I. I lit that match. 
2. A dog barked. 
In a discourse, 2 can be used to say something about a particular situation, but it can be 
used in other ways as well. Like an indefinite NP, its interpretation swings from the 
specific to the general, propelled by various other features of the discourse. 1, in contrast, 
is like a name, pointing to a particular situation in much the same way as a name points to 
a particular individual. 3 is even more tightly tied to a particular situation than 1. (It is 
tied in a different way, too: in 1, the real world facts about matches tell us that 'I lit that 
match' must be true only in virtue of one situation. For 3, it is the temporal and locative 
adverbs that tie it to one situation.) 
3. I lit a match at 10 a.m. on Feb. 1 1996 in Nashville. 
Sentences such as 2 are, in the unmarked case, more open to variable interpretation than 
are sentences such as 1 or 3. Notice that it is quite easy to quantify over situations 
described by 2, harder to quantify over situations described by 1, and not possible to 
quantify over situations described by sentences such as 3: 
4. Every time a dog barked, I jumped. 
5. ?Every time I lit that match, I burned my finger. 
6. #Every time I lit a match at the stroke of 10 a.m. on Feb. 1 1996 in Nashville, I 
burned my finger. 
The contrast between 4 and 6 is a contrast between two poles on a continuum: at one 
pole are vague sentences and at the other are specific sentences, in the sense of being 
vague about what situation they describe, on the one hand, or of describing only one 
specific situation, on the other. Vague sentences can always be made specific by 
additional information, and sentences may be made specific to various degrees. 
I will apply these ideas to the analysis of a series of contrasts between modal 
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sentences with root interpretations and modal sentences with epistemic interpretations. 
My basic idea is that epistemic modal sentences tend to be about particular situations 
whereas root modal sentences tend to be about a whole class of situations. By 'be about' I 
mean that the necessity or possibility which is asserted is held to be true, in epistemic 
cases, only of a particular situation whereas the necessity or possibility holds good across 
a class of situations in the root cases. 
Why should this be so? The reason is that it is the nature of laws, regulations, 
dispositions and abilities to be relevant in a class of situations, whereas we tend to reason 
epistemically about the situation which is of immediate concern to us. A freak of nature 
is exactly the sort of thing that is not the product of 'natural laws', colloquially 
understood, and reaching beyond one's potential on a single occasion (propelled by a rush 
of adrenaline, for example) is to do on a single occasion something that never occurs in 
the class of normal situations representing one's abilities. 1 
To build this into the semantics, I'll argue that the restrictions on epistemic modals 
differ from those on root modals: the conversational backgrounds restricting epistemic 
modals are typically situation-specific whereas those restricting root modals are typically 
situation-indefinite, in a sense to be spelled out below. 
2. Specificity and the Interpretation of Modal Sentences 
2.1. Root vs. Epistemic Modality 
Consider the modal sentences in 7-10. (The most likely sort of interpretation is 
marked for each one.) 
7. EPISTEMIC 
Considering the way the zookeeper harassed him, that tiger may bite you. 
8. EPISTEMIC 
Given the condition of the floor in the belltower, Will may have killed the 
stranger. 
9. DEONTIC 
According to Maine law, dogs may run free. 
1Palmer 1977 and Kratzer 1981, 1991 are important antecedents for the approach I take here 
in the sense that they both appeal to the idea that different kinds of modal reasoning 
underlie different types of modality. I would also like to thank Jack Brennan for discussion 
of these ideas. I 
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10. DYNAMIC 
Since she works out, Brenda can lift 100 pounds. 
In each case, the adjunct indicates the sort of conversational background (in the sense of 
Kratzer 1981, 1991) restricting the modal. I'm interested in the fact that in epistemic 7 
and 8, the adjunct directs our attention to a here and now kind of situation whereas the 
adjunct in deontic 9 directs us to all the situations where Maine law is enforced, and the 
adjunct in dynamic 10 directs our attention to all the situations where Brenda has the 
property of working out regularly.2 
These cases are representative of a systematic pragmatic difference between root 
interpretations, on the one hand, and epistemic interpretations, on the other. A variety of 
secondary interpretive phenomena suggest that the topic of an epistemic modal sentence 
is usually a particular situation whereas the topic of a root modal sentence is usually a 
class of situations. 
One such secondary interpretive phenomenon is temporal interpretation. The 
temporal interpretation of the sentence under the scope of the modal generally differs 
depending on whether the modal gets an epistemic or a root interpretation: epistemic 
interpretations of the modal generally lead to very particular temporal interpretations of 
the sentence under the scope of the modal, while this is not true of root interpretations. In 
11 and 12, the available temporal interpretations for the sentence under the scope of an 
epistemic modal coincide with the temporal interpretations generally available for the 
present tense. Specifically, stative sentences get 'now' interpretations (11) and non-
statives get habitual interpretations (12). Sentences under root modals, in contrast, tend to 
be temporally underdetermined. (See the deontic readings of 11-12.) 
11. Bill must be on time. 
Epistemic reading: It must be the case that Bill is on time (now). 
Deontic reading: It is required that Bill be on time/Bill is obliged to be on time 
(on whatever occasions the conversational background makes relevant.) 
2 It is fairly easy to come up with examples illustrating the opposite, i.e. examples in which 
an epistemic modal is restricted by a general sort of conversational background, or ones 
where root modals are restricted by a conversational background which is about a single 
situation only: 
I. epistemic: 
Given that dogs like to chew things up, it may well be that Scout is the one who chewed up your 
shoes. 
ii. deontic: 
Given the regulations concerning the Queen's activities on New Year's Day in the year 2,000, we 
must not plan a meeting for that date. 
iii. dynamic: 
Because he has the flu, John cannot lift that box. 
These examples are in keeping with the claims made in the text. They are simply atypical examples of 
modal sentences from their respective interpretive classes. 
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12. Assistant professors may take semester-long sabbaticals. 
Epistemic reading: It is possible that assistant professors take semester-long 
sabbaticals (whenever they take sabbaticals). 
Deontic reading: It is allowed that assistant professors take semester-long 
sabbaticals. I Assistant professors have the right to take a semester-long 
sabbatical. 
Specific temporal interpretations are not associated with modal sentences expressing 
regulations, regularities, rights, obligations, abilities and dispositions, unless the temporal 
information is explicitly given in the modal sentence (as in 13). 
13. Sam must appear in court of Feb. 15th 1996 at 2 p.m. in Nashville. 
The specific/general divide between epistemic modality on the one hand and root 
modality on the other, extends into the realm of nominal interpretation as well. It is 
noticeable that the interpretation of the subject NP in 14 is influenced by the 
interpretative class of the modal, as is indicated in the glosses given here. 
14. The District Attorney may be a Canadian. 
Epistemic reading: It is possible that the person who is the District Attorney (in 
the relevant context) is in fact a Canadian. 
Deontic reading: It is allowed that the District Attorney (whoever it is at any 
given time) be a Canadian. 
It often happens that type/token NPs, such as the District Attorney in this example, get 
token interpretations in epistemic sentences but get either sort of an interpretation in a 
root modal sentence. Note: The facts here are not simple. What sort of predicate ( 15) as 
well as pragmatic factors ( 16) affect the interpretation of type-token NPs markedly, 
regardless of how the modal is interpreted. 
15. The District Attorney must run three miles every day. 
Epistemic reading: It is a certainty that (this particular) DA runs three miles a 
day. 
Deontic reading a: (This particular) DAis required to run three miles a day. 
Deontic reading b: DAs in this district are required to run three miles a day. 
16. The District Attorney may be responsible for custody cases. 
12 
Epistemic reading: It is possible that the DA (whoever it is) is responsible for 
custody cases. 
Deontic reading: (?) It is allowed that the DA (whoever it is) be 
responsible for custody cases. ['(?)' = 'if available'] 
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It does seem to be the case, however, that if, in a given sentence, an NP can get a token 
reading when the modal gets a root reading, then the token reading will also be there 
when the modal is read epistemically. The converse is not always true; an epistemic 
reading of a given sentence may co-incide with a token interpretation of an NP in that 
sentence, while the token interpretation is not available given a root reading of the modal. 
This is what happens in 14, the case of immediate concern to me. It is with this 
understanding in mind that I claim that epistemic modals are associated more strongly 
with token readings of NPs than root modals are. 
2.2. Conversational Backgrounds 
The foregoing facts are unsurprising if we assume that in the epistemic cases the 
conversational background has already provided information about time and the identity 
of the District Attorney, and that the conversational background relevant for root readings 
has not provided such information. It is my idea that epistemic modal reasoning typically 
does rest on information of just this kind, i.e. on information which is particular to a 
given situation, and that reasoning which concerns the root modalities typically rests on 
much more general information. (In fact, this tendency is so strong that even when the 
modal sentences are presented out of context (as 11, 12, and 14 were here), native 
speakers supply appropriately specific or general conversational backgrounds for 
epistemic and root readings respectively.) This section is devoted to a more detailed 
discussion of 'conversational backgrounds', with pointers to some partially analogous 
devices found in the semantics and pragmatics literature, followed by a more precise 
statement of the proposed analysis of 11, 12, and 14. 
The term 'conversational background' was coined by Angelika Kratzer to talk 
about the background information relevant for interpreting a modal expression, most 
fundamentally for setting up the accessibility relation in terms of which the modal is 
interpreted on a given occasion of use. The adjuncts in 7-10 are all suggestive of what 
might be included in the conversational background. In Kratzer's analysis of the 
semantics of modal words, conversational backgrounds are formal objects : 
conversational backgrounds are functions which assign to every member of W a subset of 
the power set of W (Kratzer, 1991, p. 641 ). This is summarized, first in prose form and 
then formally, in 17. 
17. A conversational background, f, is a function mapping worlds onto sets of 
propositions. 
Iff is a conversational background, then for all worlds w E W: 
f(w) -7 A, where A !;;;; !? (W) 
Kratzer goes on to show that modal worlds are doubly relative (to pragmatically 
supplied conversational backgrounds), depnding on one conversational background to 
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determine the modal base and on a second to determine the ordering source; both the 
modal base and the ordering source relativize the interpretation of the modal to particular 
contextually determined concerns. 
Although space precludes discussion of the motivation for and details of this 
analysis here, I must at least note that the modal base in Kratzer's semantics coincides 
with the set of accessible worlds in the semantics for modal logic of long-standing in 
philosophy. (See Hughes and Cresswe111968 for an introduction to philosophical modal 
logic.) So, in this framework, the conversational background determines what worlds are 
accessible on a given occasion: a world w' is accessible from a world w iff all the 
propositions in f(w) are true in w' (where 'f' is the conversational background, as above.) 
The structural role played by the conversational background determining the 
modal base (the 'mb-cb', hereafter) very closely resembles the structural role played by 
the restriction in any tripartite quantifier structure. Partee 1991 provides 18 as an 
illustration of operator-headed structure in its most general form. The schema in 19 
makes explicit how modals fit onto this pattern. In what follows, I will frequently refer to 
the mb-cb as 'the restriction on the modal'. 
18. Partee's (1991) Generalized Tripartite Structure 
OPERATOR 
v 
must 
not 
almost every 
always topic 
mostly 
GENERIC 
s 
RESTRICTOR 
'cases' 
if-clause 
subordinate clauses 
NUCLEAR SCOPE 
main clause 
assertion 
focus 
common noun phrase consequent 
main predication 
presuppositions 
domain 
antecedent 
context 
19. Modals [conversational background (s) 1 [scope (s) 1 
It is also worthwhile here to consider a somewhat less formal characterization of 
conversational backgrounds. Presumably, the conversational background that relativizes 
the interpretation of a modal on a given occasion consists of a set of propositions on a 
given topic, which the speakers and hearers in the discourse situation accept as true and 
of which they are, in some sense, aware. Viewed in this way, conversational backgrounds 
look a lot like presuppositional common grounds, as defined in Stalnaker 1979 and used 
in a great deal of subsequent work on discourse in formal semantics. As McConnell-
Ginet and Chierchia 1990 point out, however, conversational backgrounds restricting 
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modals and the common ground of the discourse must be distinguished; in discourses 
such as 20, the first proposition is as a matter of course part of the common ground for 
evaluating the second, but it plainly must not be part of conversational background 
restricting the modal: if it were, the modal sentence would inevitably be false. 
20. Loren didn't sing. But she could have. 
Furthermore, the two conversational backgrounds that Kratzer employs are different from 
one another: one tells what worlds are accessible and the other ranks the accessible 
worlds according to how well they approximate some ideal. The moral of all of these 
cautionary notes is that the mass of relevant information available to speakers and hearers 
in a discourse is often drawn on selectively by various linguistic devices. One device 
(such as the record of presuppositions) may well pull out different information from what 
is pulled out by another (such as a dynamic conversational background.) 
Finally, in future work, it will be worthwhile to explore how well conversational 
backgrounds match up with topics. These mechanisms resemble one another 
superficially at least, and to the extent that they can be viewed as the same thing we have 
a better chance of catching now elusive generalizations cutting across modal and non-
modal data. 
At any rate, conversational backgrounds are the device that I will use to explain 
the root/epistemic contrasts in 11, 12 and 14. For the definitions of the modals provided 
here (in 23 and 24), I have (in 22) adapted Kratzer's notion of conversational 
backgrounds for a semantic framework where sentences denote sets of situations (see 21.) 
I assume the semantic framework developed in Portner 1992, the major features of which 
are summarized in the appendix. 
21. A proposition <1> denotes the set of situations s e S s.t. <I> (s) = 1. 
22. A conversational background, f, is a function from situations to the intersection of 
sets of sets of situations [i.e. from situations to (the intersection of) sets of 
propositions]. 
23. [must (a)(~)]= 1 iff the set of situations in which a is true is a subset of the set 
of situations in which ~ is true. 
24. [can( a)(~)]= 1 iffthe set of situations in which a is true intersects with the set 
of situations in which ~ is true. 
In Section 2.1, it was shown that epistemic readings of a modal are associated 
with well-defined temporal and nominal interpretations of material under the scope of the 
modal, and we saw that this was not the case for root readings of the modals. It was also 
noted that while these associations tend to occur, this tendency mayt be overridden 
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(resulting in temporally determinate interpretations of sentences under the scope of root 
modals, for example.) I account for these facts by positing that epistemic modality is 
typically associated with conversational backgrounds that specify such things as time and 
the identity of individuals, whereas root modalities typically are associated with much 
more general conversational backgrounds. More to the point, for epistemic readings of 
11, 12 and 14, speakers and hearers supply conversational backgrounds which specify the 
(a) value of the temporal parameter, and (b) the identity of the District Attorney in the 
context of utterance. For root readings of these sentences, speakers and hearers normally 
supply no such specific information. 
Immediately below, I have provided explict sample epistemic and deontic 
conversational backgrounds for the modal sentence in 11. 
25. Bill must be on time (=11) 
sample deontic conversational background: 
a. Bill is a subway conductor. 
b. Subway conductors work shifts that last precisely 8 hours, from 7a.m-
3p.m., 3p.m.-llp.m., or 1lp.m.-7a.m. 
c. Subway conductors leave exactly when their shifts end. 
Given a-cas the conversational background, a, [must [a ][Bill be on time] ] = 
1 iff the set of situations in which a-c hold is a subset of the set of situations in 
which Bill is on time. 
26. Bill must be on time (=11) 
sample epistemic conversational background: 
a. Bill is expected at Sp.m. 
b. It is now 7:59p.m. 
c. Bill's car just pulled up in front of the house .. 
Given a-cas the conversational background, a, [must [a ][Bill be on time]]= 
I iff the set of situations in which a-c hold is a subset of the set of situations in 
which Bill is on time. 
Because the conversational background in 26 explicitly makes reference to the utterance 
situation, in this case the conversational background is for all intents and purposes 
equivalent to the presuppositional common ground, discussed earlier. Root readings, in 
contrast, rarely arise when the relevant conversational background is the presuppositional 
common ground; root readings instead arise against conversational backgrounds setting 
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out what would be true if all the rules were followed, or what could be true if one 
exercised all of one's capacities, or what one would like to be true. 
The reason the epistemic reading of 11 gives rise to such a specific temporal 
interpretation of 'Bill be on time' is that 'Bill be on time' inherits the value of the 
temporal parameter which is fixed in the conversational background. Becuase this is the 
time of utterance, 'Bill be on time' is interpreted in exactly the same way as the present 
tense sentence 'Bill is on time' is interpreted. A similar account can be given of the 
type/token NP difference seen in 14: by hypothesis, an epistemic conversational 
background will typically identify the actual District Attorney whereas a deontic 
conversational background does not. Taking the sentences out of context, we assume the 
modals are behaving in a normal way and so the intuitions about 14 are those described 
above. 
2.3. Situation-Specific vs. Situation-Indefinite Propositions and 
Conversational Backgrounds 
I have claimed that epistemic conversational backgrounds in effect are the 
presuppositional common ground, and more specifically that they often contain 
information that resolves temporal and nominal indeterminacy while root conversational 
backgrounds do not. While this suffices to explain the facts from Section 2.1 regarding 
11, 12 and 14, I am going to make a stronger claim here: epistemic conversational 
backgrounds concern only one actual situation, whereas root conversational backgrounds 
concern more than one.3 
The advantage in positing this fundamental difference between epistemic and root 
conversational backgrounds is that such a difference would (a) make sense out of the fact 
that epistemic modal sentences often seem to be more immediate and particular in 
meaning than root modal sentences (witness the facts in Section 2.1), and (b) make it 
possible to explain why epistemic modal sentences, unlike root modal sentences, don't 
serve as the scope to a wide scope adverb, as will be seen below. 
The definitions of situation-specific proposition (28) and situation-indefinite 
proposition (29) immediately below will enable me to be more precise about the ideas 
just presented. These definitions presuppose a definition of distinct; it appears in 27. 
27. Two situations sands' are distinct iff sis not part-of s' and s' is not part-of s.• 
3The obvious difficulty with this claim lies in the phrase 'one situation': how do we measure 
situations in order to count them? Numerous authors have discussed this issue, and I will 
address it and von Fintel 1994's approach to it in the next section. For the time being, I will 
presuppose that there is a coherent way of measuring and counting situations available. 
4 For the definition of the part-of relation, as well as for the other defmitions providing 
the semantic framework assumed here, see the appendix. 
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28. A (tenseless) proposition pis situation-specific iff for all situations s' inS and all 
world-situations s-w inS, if p(s') = 1 and s' is part of s-w, then there is nos" 
distinct from s' and s" is part-of s-w s.t. p(s") = 1. 
29. A (tenseless) proposition pis situation-indefinite iff for some s-w there are two 
distinct situations sands', each of which is part-of s-w s.t. p(s) = 1 and p(s') = 1. 
30. A conversational background, f, is situation-specific when applied to a world w iff 
n f(w) is a situation-specific proposition. 
Notice that situation-specific propositions are true in at most one situation per 
world. This is guaranteed in part by the fact that, in the semantics assumed here, 
situations are structured by the part-of relation onto complete join semi-lattices, the 
maximal element of any such semi-lattice being a world. The point is spelled out in the 
theorems presented in 31 and 32. 
31. The cardinality of the set of worlds containing situations where p is true is the 
same as the cardinality of the set of situations where p is true, if p is situation-
specific. 
32. The cardinality of the set of worlds containing situations where p is true is smaller 
than the cardinality of the set of situations where p is true, if p is situation-
indefinite. 
When a conversational background is situation-specific, then, the modal quantification 
over accessible situations reduces to traditional modal quantification over accessible 
worlds. This is not the case for 25, where the conversational background is not (in 
plausible models) situation-specific. Sittuation-specific conversational backgrounds 
come in to play later in explaining why adverbs of quantification don't take scope over 
modal sentences with epistemic interpretations. 
The account of 11, 12 and 14 developed in the previous section carries over to this 
one; it is placed in a broader perspective here. It makes sense that situation-specific 
conversational backgrounds characteristically supply information that helps fix the 
temporal parameter and the identity of individuals described by NPs, among other things. 
3. Measuring Situations 
In quantifying overs situations, one of the tricky jobs is getting the 'grain' right, a 
point discussed in Krifka 1989 and von Fintel 1994, inter alia. In a sentence such as 33, 
for example, it is important that we count each cabin-building once; we want to avoid 
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counting a situation in which John built one cabin and then another as a single cabin-
building situation, for example-- it should count as two. (What if John used metal nails 
in the second cabin in such a case?The sentence should come out false, but it wouldn't.) 
33. When John builds a cabin, he always uses wooden nails. 
sense: Every situation in which John builds a cabin is a situation in which he uses 
wooden nails. 
von Fintel1994 proposes the general semantic schema for adverbs of quantification given 
in 34 and the particular rule for always appearing in 35. It assigns the meaning representd 
by 36 to the sentence at hand. 
34. von Fintel's schema for the semantics of quantificational adverbs 
[ Q-Adverb-3] (a)(~)= {s: B * [minimal( an S(sw)), part-of(~)] } 
35. Semantic rule for always from von Fintel1994 
[always] (a)(~)= {s: {s': minimal( a 11 S(s))} !;;; {s': 3 s" s.t. s' is part-of s" and 
s" E ~ } } 
36. [Always (John builds a cabin) (John uses wooden nails)] = 1 iff 
the set of minimal real-world situations in which John builds a cabin is a subset 
of the (set of parts of the) situations in which John uses wooden nails. 
One feature of this definition to pay attention to is the use of 'minimal' in the 
specification of the first argument a .s 
In general with telic sentences, we count by the culmination point of the telic 
event. A problem arises, however, when the restriction on an adverb of quantification is 
atelic (i.e. a state or an activity) rather than telic (such as the accomplishment sentence 
used in 33.) In atelic cases, the grain at which situations are counted is more plainly a 
consequence of pragmatic factors. Consider the examples in 37-39. 
37. Whenever a child is taller than the teacher, there's trouble. [Likely grain of 
situations: one classroom over the course of a school year.] 
38. Sometimes, if I'm happy, I forget my troubles. 
[Likely grain of situations: stretches of time of a length determined by the 
speaker: possibly he has in mind years of his life, possibly he has in mind sub-
intervals of single days] 
5 von Fintel makes it clear that he is aware of difficulties with counting by 'minimal 
situations'; the issues raised here are not his central concern. 
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39. He is never quiet at night. 
[Likely grain of situations: Periods of time long enough for someone to notice 
that he is being quiet.] 
In cases where the restriction is atelic, the size of the situation that must be counted varies 
widely from sentence to sentence, depending on extra-grammatical factors. In 37, for 
example, the fact that one is talking about classrooms, students and teachers presumably 
brings to mind the notion of school-year-size situations; in 38, the immediate concerns of 
the speaker determine the size of the situations that are counted; for 39, what the pronoun 
he refers to will affect what size situations are to be counted (very small if he refers to a 
baby, for example, but bigger if he refers to an adult, or a pet.) 
In order to reflect this dependence on the context, I'll assume that there's a set of 
measure functions which map propositions onto propositions in such a way that the 
output propositions denote a set of situations of the appropriate grain. The definition for 
these functions appears in 40. 
40. For any <p, t and f: 
sizef is a function mapping propositions <p onto propositions t in such a way that 
t ~ <p, and for all s E t, s has the dimensions specified by f. [Dimensions may be 
spatio-temporal or other.] 
Given 40, I'll assume the revised general schema for quantificational adverb semantics 
appearing in 41. 
41. [ Q-Adverb- o] (a)(~)= {s: o *[sizef (a) n S(sw)), ( 3 s" s.t. s' is part-of s" and 
s" E~]} 
In the case of telic restrictions, size( a) will normally yield the spatio-temporally minimal 
situations in which is true, and the semantics will tum out just as in von Fin tel's 
analysis. In the case of atelic restrictions, the size that counts will vary widely from 
sentence to sentence. 
4. A Puzzle6 
In each of 42-44, a modal sentence is embedded under an adverb. 
6 See latridou 1990 for some related observations. 
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42. Usually, students may use the copy machine on the first floor. 
Gloss: Usually, it is allowed that students use the copy machine on the first floor. 
Not available: Usually, it is possible that student use the copy machine on the 
first floor. 
43. While working for Unisys, Bob must wear a suit. 
Gloss: Throughout the time Bob works at Unisys, he is required to wear a suit. 
Not available: Throughout the time Bob works at Unisys, it is a certainty that he 
wears a suit. 
44. At high altitudes, Brenda can run a 6 minute mile. 
Gloss: At high altitudes, Brenda has the capacity to run a 6 minute mile. 
Not available: At high altitudes, it is possible that Brenda runs/will run a 6 min. 
mile. 
In each of these examples, an adverb taking wide-scope over the modal affects the 
range of interpretation associated with that modal. More specifically, epistemic readings 
of a modal sentence are, in the unmarked case, lost when the modal sentence is under the 
scope of an adverb of quantification (42), a durative temporal adverb (43), or an 
indefinite locative adverb interpreted generically (44). The root readings remain in the 
presence of these adverbs. The remainder of this paper is devoted to explaining these 
facts. 
5. A-Quantification 
In the semantics adopted here, both modals and adverbs of quantification range 
over situations; the difference is that the adverbs only range over actual situations, 
whereas the modals range over the whole class of situations, whether actual or not. The 
similarity between modals and adverbs is brought out by the semantic schemata in 45-46. 
45.[=19] Modal 
8 
[conversational background (s)] [scope (s)] 
46. Adverb of quantification 
8 
[restriction(s)][scope (s)] 
Partee 1991, discussing different types of quantification found in natural language, 
discusses a fundamental divide between quantification in nouns phrases ('D-
quantification') and quantification by verbal and adverbial expressions ('A-
quantification'). A-quantifiers tend to rely much more centrally on contextually supplied 
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information for their restrictions whereas the central restriction on aD-quantifier is fixed 
by the syntax. 
5.1. Nested A-Quantifiers Share Restrictions 
In each of the sentences in 42-44, one A-quantifier is nested inside another. The 
puzzling fact is that when a modal is nested under an extensional A-quantifier, episternic 
readings are lost. A new observation about A-quantifiers is critical to solving this puzzle: 
it appears to be the case that when one A-quantifier is nested inside another, the two share 
many (if not all) restrictions. Consider 47. 
47. Mostly, when the semester is over and a book is overdue, it must be returned to 
the main library. 
Let's assume that 47 is spoken in a University Z context. The implicit restrictions 
available from the context are that the only situations one is to consider are those where 
University Z's regulations are followed. The explicit restrictions are that the semester be 
over and a book be overdue. Given the definition of mostly in 48, the truth condition for 
47 is 49. 
48. [mostly (a)(~)]= 1 iff l{s: s e size{a)} n {s: s E ~}I ~ 2/31{s: s E a}l 
49. [mostly (the semester is over and a book i is overdue and the situation is at 
University Z) (must(cb)(a book i be returned to the main library))]= 1 
iff l{s: s E sizefthe semester is over and a book i is overdue and the situation is 
at University Z)}n{s: s E must(cb)(a book i be returned to the main library)] }I 
~ 2/3 l{s: s E the semester is over and a book i is overdue and the situation is at 
University Z }I 
short form: at least 2/3 of the relevant situations are ones where the book 
in question must be returned to the main library. 
Asking now what the content of the cb restricting must is in this example, it appears that 
it must be restricted at least by the same information restricting the adverb of 
quantification. Thus, the only accessible situations for the modal sentence will be those 
where the regulations of University Z are observed and a book is overdue after the 
semester is over. Failing to include these restrictions on the modal, or alternatively 
failing to include them as part of the restriction on the adverb gives unintuitive truth 
conditions, where for example, 2/3 of the situations where a book is overdue after the 
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semester is over at some library are ones where the book must be returned at the main 
library at University Z. 
On the basis of this discussion, I'll assume 50. 
50. Restrictions on A-Quantifiers: Given two A-quantifiers in one sentence, one 
taking scope over the other, the implicit restrictions on either of the two 
quantifiers also restrict the other. 
For extensive discussion of data connected to determining the domain restrictions on A-
quantifiers, see Roberts 1994. 
5.2. Vacuous Quantification 
A number of authors have pointed out that quantifiers are anomalous in sentences 
such as 51-53. Kratzer (1995) called this vacuous quantification and stipulated that 
quantification when there are no variables free is prohibited. For her, the problem with 
51 is that there are no free variables to be bound by the quantifier, always. 
51. John is always tall. 
Noticeably, however, this kind of anomaly persists, even when the syntax of the logical 
form would not violate the prohibition on vacuous quantification. This fact is illustrated 
by 52. 
52. Every/Some/One/No day that I was born was snowy. 
52 is true iff { x: day that I was born x} ~ { x: snowy x} 
Similarly in the adverbial case in 53: 
53. It was always cold at 5 p.m. on February 1st 1996 in Nashville. 
On the view taken here, vacuous quantification is quantification over an impoversihed 
domain (i.e. a domain with only one member); such quantification is always infelicitous. 
The reason for the infelicity is probably that using quantification (a complex structure in 
comparison with the simple first-order function-argument application called for in the 
case of simple predication) to predicate something of an individual violates principles of 
conversational cooperation enjoining speakers to say what they have to say as simply as 
they can. 
The difficulty in getting adverbs of quantification to take scope over epistemic 
modals is fundamentally a difficulty of this kind: as we will see below, the epistemic 
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conversational background ends up being so specific to a particular situation that 
quantification over a class of situations by a wider scope adverbial operator becomes 
impossible. 
5.3 Explaining the Loss of Epistemic Readings in 42-44 
With this understanding of -quantification in mind, the puzzle posed by 42-44 
resolves itself. The readings of those sentences which are of interest here all involve an 
extensional A-quantifier (the adverb) taking scope over an intensional A-quantifier (the 
modal). Given the premise that these operators share restrictions, it is critical that the 
restriction be situation-indefinite. Situation-specific restrictions only work on intensional 
operators (as the quantification is vacuous otherwise). 
Thus, epistemic interpretations are successful as long as the modal sentence isn't 
embedded under an extensional A-quantifier. Once embedded under such a quantifier, 
however, any reading which depends upon a situation-specific conversational background 
will disappear. This is what happens in 42-44. The reason is that the wide-scope 
extensional adverb demands a situation-indefinite restriction. Root readings, typically, 
arise when the modal is supplied with a situation-indefinite restriction. Therefore, these 
readings remain in the presence of a wide-scope adverb. 
6. Conclusion 
Situation-specific restrictions have a variety of effects on A-Quantification. At a 
minimum, they reduce modal quantification over situations to quantification over worlds, 
fix the reference of context-dependent NPs (such as the District Attorney), and 
fix temporal interpretation. 
I claim here that epistemic conversational backgrounds are the same as the 
presuppositional common ground of the discourse. More generally it was shown that 
modal sentences which concern deduction from the speaker's knowledge tend to be about 
specific situations. In the semantics/pragmatics, this means that the restrictions on 
epistemic modals tend to be situation-specific, with all of the consequences laid out 
above. In contrast, when we talk about regulations, regularities, rights, obligations, 
dispositions and abilities, of necessity we are talking about classes of situations and 
hence the conversational backgrounds restricting root modals are by their nature 
situation-indefinite. 
These generalizations about which interpretive classes get situation-specific 
restrictions and which get situation-indefinite restrictions spring from the nature of 
human reasoning and from the nature of laws, regulations and abilities, and not from any 
structural distinctions between the types of modal expressions in the language. 
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Appendix 
The structure of the models and the basics of interpretation assumed here are adopted 
directly from Portner 1992. 
Models 
i. A model is a 5-tuple consisting of a set of individuals (1), a set of 
situations (S), a counterpart relation on I, a part-of relation < on I, and a 
temporal ordering on S. S is a subset of I. 
Interpretation 
ii. Expressions are interpreted w .r.t. a model, M, a situation of utterance u, a 
reference situation r, a context of utterance C, a variable assignment 
function g, and a situations e S. 
iii. Situation of utterance, u, includes at least: specification of time, 
speaker, addressee, location of utterance. 
iv. Context of utterance , C, is set of pairs consisting of a situation and an 
assignment function. 
Definitions 
v. The intension of an expression is a function from situations to the 
extension of the expression in that situation. 
vi. The part-of relation between situations induces a structuring of S. Given 
any two situations s, s' such that s<s' [read: sis part-of s'], sands' are on a 
complete join semi-lattice; the maximal element on this semi-lattice is 
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the world of sands'. Situations which are worlds will be designated by 
variables bearing a w subscript (e.g. s w·) [See among others Bach 1986.] 
